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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING WILLS AND TRUSTS: THE JURISDICTIONAL
PROBLEM

ADAM J. HIRSCH*
Anyone preparing to teach Wills and Trusts faces a dilemma when
choosing a jurisdictional perspective. Most of the rules found in the inheritance
field are a matter of state law, and most of that law nowadays finds expression
in local statutes. In the nineteenth century, only a few discrete areas of the
inheritance field—the rules of intestacy, the rules of formalization, spousal
rights—were codified.1 The subsequent movement toward “statutorification”2
swept up inheritance law, along with many other categories of doctrine; today
every state has its own probate code, invariably supplemented by common-law
rules, but covering large swaths of terrain previously governed by judge-made
law.3 Scholars examining the general movement toward statutorification have
emphasized its tendency to entrench rules.4 Another subtler, and less remarked,
consequence of the movement has been to encourage pluralism, unleashing
centrifugal forces once lawmakers in individual states, freed from the moorings
of precedent and from a common-law jurisprudence that valued
interjurisdictional conformity, began innovating and fiddling.5 Those forces
have caused inheritance law in the United States to become increasingly
diversified.
This state of affairs leaves Wills and Trusts professors in a quandary. To
attempt to cover the law of all fifty states would be hopeless. But to teach the
law of any one state seems hopelessly narrow. This problem doubtless arises

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D. 1987,
Yale University.
1. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance: United States Law, in 3 OXFORD
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 235, 235–37 (Stanley N. Katz ed. 2009).
2. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
3. For a legislative tally of all 50 state probate codes, see Uniform Probate Code (UPC)
Adoption By The States, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litiga
tion_committees/trust/50-state-probate-code-survey.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
4. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 1–7; GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 95–96 (1977).
5. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 74, 76–77 (hinting at the phenomenon); Giacomo A. M.
Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2008).
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for professors teaching in other areas, too, but it is particularly acute in the
inheritance field.
For professors teaching at “regional” law schools, the pluralistic turn of
Wills and Trusts could invite a narrowing of perspective. I spent years teaching
at a law school where a large majority of graduates went on to practice in-state.
One of my colleagues there made a career-long practice of teaching, and
testing on, the state’s probate code—transforming the class, in effect, into an
expanded bar-review course. If nothing else, this approach simplifies the task
of the professor (and of the students). It also serves the purpose of preparing
students for the state bar examination, and for local practice thereafter. Indeed,
by encouraging all of its professors to follow suit, a law school can seek to
establish a local reputation for high bar-passage rates, doubtless a selling point
for a program competing with other regional law schools for in-state students.
For any law school with larger aspirations, though, the downside of this
approach is obvious. To teach locally encourages students to think locally—to
play the part that their professors assign to them. And, for those students who
do get the opportunity to practice in another jurisdiction, the value of a statebased Wills and Trusts course decreases—possibly a subtle disincentive for
graduates who wish to practice in the field to seek out opportunities beyond the
state where they studied. When I arrived at my current law school, I was told
unequivocally that the administration would prefer that I not emphasize local
law. Needless to add, the notion of teaching a localized Wills and Trusts course
within any one of the top, nationally-recognized law schools would be
outlandish. Upon graduation, its students will scatter among the states, making
a focus on any one state’s law, including that of the state where the law school
happens to be located, pointless and arbitrary.
An alternative approach—equally narrow in one sense, but broader in
another—is to concentrate on, and to test on, the “model” laws of Wills and
Trusts.6 The field is fortunate to have at its disposal two up-to-date
Restatements: the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and the Restatement (Third)
of Property, completed in 2005 and 2010, respectively.7 These are paralleled
by two modern Uniform Acts: the Uniform Trust Code, promulgated in 2000,
and the Uniform Probate Code, whose revised substantive article dates to 1990,
with significant amendments in 2008.8 These products are highly integrated.
The reporter for the revised Uniform Probate Code doubled as reporter for the

6. One current casebook is geared to this approach. See THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY
PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS (5th ed.
2011).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (2010).
8. UNIF. TRUST CODE, 7C U.L.A. 362–74 (amended 2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 pts. 1–
3 U.L.A. (amended 2010).
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Restatement (Third) of Property, and he strove “to try to make [them] . . .
consistent with one another.”9 Likewise, “[t]he Uniform Trust Code was
drafted in close coordination with the writing of the Restatement Third [of
Trusts].”10
By teaching the model laws, a professor can again emphasize a single,
coherent body of law, while at the same time eschewing localism. The
difficulty remains that, in so doing, the Wills and Trusts course becomes, to a
certain degree, detached from reality. Although the Uniform Probate Code has
proven influential in some pockets of the field—notably with regard to its
intestacy provisions—thus far only sixteen, mostly smallish, jurisdictions have
adopted substantial parts of either the current or an earlier version of the
Code.11 The “big four” states, California, Florida, New York, and Texas, all
continue to go their own way.12 What is more, even the sixteen adopters have
seen fit to tinker with, or to omit, many of the Code’s provisions.13 Some of the
Code’s less popular sections are scarcely in effect anywhere, turning up in only
tiny handfuls of states.14 To teach such rules as law makes little sense, at least
in a doctrinal course. The Uniform Trust Code has proven a more popular
product, but even it is confined to half the states, among them only one of the
“big four”—Florida—where local lawmakers tinkered to such an extent that
they renamed their handiwork the Florida Trust Code.15
Largely keyed in their third iterations to the Uniform Acts, the
Restatements feature similar attributes. These products “purport to state an
authoritative or recommended view of current American common law,”16 as
well as statutes in some instances, “[a]s is increasingly true of Restatement

9. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Why I Do Law Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 732
(2012).
10. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 364, 366 (amended 2010).
11. These are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Utah. Uniform Probate Code (UPC) Adoption By The States, supra note 3.
12. Id.
13. Massachusetts, the most recent state to adopt the Uniform Probate Code as an omnibus
act in 2012, nevertheless left out several of the Code’s more controversial provisions: its
disclaimer law and its harmless-error power, among others. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
190B, §§ 2-503, 2-801 (West 2012). The reporter has complained about local tinkering, but the
practice continues. See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of
Gratuitous Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 878–79 (1992).
14. For example, the Uniform Probate Code’s modern antilapse provision appears in its
original form in some five states, as tallied by the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 statutory note 1 (1999).
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0101 (West 2013).
16. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law
at Century’s End, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1881 (2000) (emphasis added) (writing as reporter for
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts).
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work.”17 In progressive editions, the Restatements have grown more and more
aspirational,18 sometimes even taking positions contrary to judicial doctrine
that is accepted today by overwhelming numbers of courts.19 In the process,
the Restatements’ authority has waned, and they are cited less and less
frequently in the case law.20 Courts know better than to accept reflexively the
third Restatements as distillations of existing law.21 In a few instances, the
reporters’ zeal in pressing their innovations appears to have prompted
misrepresentations that call for added caution. For example, in the course of
endorsing the “harmless error” doctrine for wills, the reporter claims that the
Restatement (Third) of Property is “aligned with [the] modern trend.”22 In
truth, only six jurisdictions have adopted a full-blown version of the doctrine—
scarcely a trend.23 Moreover, some ideas propounded in the Restatements have
no prospect of ever becoming law. For instance, the Restatement (Third) of
Property offers up major revisions of the law of future interests.24 To my mind,
these revisions would make a great deal of sense, yet they could never
realistically dislodge the formulations that have remained entrenched in Anglo-

17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS foreword (2003).
18. For an exploration of the trend, see David A. Thomas, Restatements Relating to
Property: Why Lawyers Don’t Really Care, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 655, 657–75 (2004).
19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 2.7 cmt. a (“this section reverses the common-law rule”).
20. A search of the Westlaw database finds that the Restatement (Second) of Property:
Donative Transfers, promulgated between 1983 and 1992, has been cited in a total of eightyseven state and federal cases. After sixteen years, this Restatement project began to be superseded
by the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, promulgated
between 1999 and 2010, and now operative (at least in part) for fourteen years. Thus far, the
Restatement (Third) has been cited in a total of only fifty-five state and federal cases. Professor
David Thomas found that the modern Restatements of property have proven far less influential,
as measured by case citations, than the equivalent Restatements of tort and contract. See Thomas,
supra note 18, at 656 & n.1.
21. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 902 (Ill. 2009) (“We have not yet had
reason to consider whether any section of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts . . . is an accurate
expression of Illinois law”). Restatements have been adopted as de facto common law, however,
in two jurisdictions: the Virgin Islands and the Northern Mariana Islands. Kristen David Adams,
The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423,
425–46 (2004).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt.
b.
23. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-503 (LexisNexis 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.2503 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West
2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (West 1998).
See also supra note 13 (remarking the failure of Massachusetts—the most recent state to adopt
the Uniform Probate Code—to enact the doctrine).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS div.
VII (2011).
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American law for centuries on end.25 In this and other areas, the Restatements
have become, in the words of one critic, “academic exercises . . . [with] little
influence on the actual daily application and administration of the law,”26 very
like portions of the Uniform Probate Code, and less the “handy resources for
trust and estate lawyers”27 that they are supposed to be. The model laws can
usefully be taught, but not as representative of current Wills and Trusts
doctrine.
Concentration on the model laws would make sense only in a pure policy
course. Those laws may gain acceptance somehow, somewhere, sometime, but
they are not the law of the present. To focus on them in a Wills and Trusts
course today represents an indulgence that only professors at the most elite law
schools could contemplate.
This still leaves the possibility of teaching what Professor Melvin
Eisenberg dubbed “national law,” to wit, “statements of and about law in
general terms, divorced from particular jurisdictions.”28 Casebooks typically
adopt this approach. It presents a challenge in the inheritance field, where
national law remains about as decentralized as law can be. But casebooks and
courses can still present majority rules as indicative of our national inheritance
law.
In my judgment, such an approach remains impoverished, in that it fails to
communicate the richness of alternatives, the thousand flowers (mixed with a
few poisonous weeds) that have blossomed in this heterogeneous region of the
legal landscape.
Which brings me to my own preferred, albeit idiosyncratic, approach to the
jurisdictional problem. In my Wills and Trusts course, I strive to broaden my
exploration of national law by elaborating—or, when appropriate, briefly
outlining—the range of doctrinal options that exists among the states. Where
the options are binary, or even ternary, I take the time to teach each one, even
if one of them dominates the field: for instance, with regard to the problem of
lapsed bequests, where the beneficiary named under a will predeceases the
testator, I teach both the modern remain-in-the-residue rule and the traditional
no-residue-upon-a-residue rule, even though the second of these hangs on by a

25. Nonetheless, hope springs eternal. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, What’s in the Third and
Final Volume of the New Restatement of Property that Estate Planners Should Know About, 38
ACTEC J. 23, 28–33, 42–45 (2012) [hereinafter Waggoner, Restatement]. Parts of this division of
the Restatement are based upon a reform proposal propounded over forty years ago, to no avail,
by the reporter. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal
for Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REV. 729 passim (1972).
26. Thomas, supra note 18, at 695.
27. Waggoner, Restatement, supra note 25, at 45.
28. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Concept of National Law and the Rule of Recognition, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1229, 1230, 1232 (2002).
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thread today, in only eight jurisdictions.29 I do so not because the no-residueupon-a-residue rule is doctrinally important in American law. Plainly, it no
longer is. Its significance rather is didactic. By teaching both majority and
minority rules, one can elucidate to students that the majority rule, even if it
reigns supreme, is not written in stone—and one can do so in a concrete way
(so to say), by demonstrating that alternatives do exist, however seldom seen.
In other words, by identifying alternative rules, the professor lays the predicate
for a policy discussion, giving students the opportunity to compare actual,
alternative rules, to contemplate their relative virtues and vices, and perhaps
even to think creatively about other alternatives not yet adopted or
contemplated by lawmakers anywhere.
Of course, in those regions of the law of Wills and Trusts (not few in
number) where an even greater wealth of doctrinal alternatives exists, this
approach becomes too time-consuming to pursue comprehensively.
Identification of such pluralisms is itself significant, but here the only realistic
choice open to the professor is between generalization and teaching local law.
One can, for example, point out that some states augment the intestacy rights
of whole-blooded relatives over half-blooded relatives, without delving into all
of the myriad ways that different states do so. Again, this recognition can
suffice as an entryway to a policy discussion of whether half-blooded relatives
should be amalgamated with or distinguished from whole-blooded relatives in
an intestacy scheme, again rendering the legal dichotomy concrete, but in a
more generalized way.
Finally, and perhaps a trifle pedantically, I strive to add a statistical
component to my presentation by indicating the actual or approximate number
of states that take one or another approach to each topic within the field of
Wills and Trusts. That is difficult to do as concerns areas that continue to be
governed by judicial doctrine but relatively easy to do with respect to rules that
have been codified. Many sections of the Restatement (Third) of Property
include “statutory notes” tallying local variations, sometimes with minor
inaccuracies and in need of updating,30 but helpful for present purpose; and, of
course, Westlaw’s statutory data-base represents another invaluable source of
information on this score. Obviously, the point of this exercise is not for
students to learn how many states have adopted each alternative, let alone what
states have adopted which ones, but simply to give students a rough idea of
which alternatives predominate, and the extent to which they do so.
Testing also requires clarification in connection with this approach. It
seems inappropriate to test students on a singular national law when one has
enriched it with a discussion of alternatives. My solution is to ask students to
29. For a summary of the history, see Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1423, 1468–69 (2013).
30. See, e.g., id. at 1460 n.185.
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prepare themselves to do either of two things: either to apply a specific rule set
out in a statutory excerpt included in the hypothetical problem that I compose,
operative only for purposes of that problem, or, in the absence of such a
statutory excerpt, to work out the solution under the principal alternative rules,
assuming no single rule prevails. But I also emphasize that I will call upon
students to apply alternative rules only in those areas where no more than two
alternatives exist—otherwise, the exercise becomes too complicated.
Finally, let me add that the academic tension between the general and the
particular in this field is not inescapable. Given sufficient time, one can take
both approaches simultaneously. At least when teaching at a regional law
school, I end the discussion of national doctrine and policy with respect to each
and every topic that I cover by indicating, for the students’ edification and not
for purposes of the final examination, which option lawmakers in “our” state
have adopted. That way, those students who do wind up practicing in-state
have a body of doctrinal information at their disposal to which they can always
refer back, for purposes of bar review or beyond, without regionalizing the
course in the bargain.
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